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2 
LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL 
BASES FOR LICENSURE 
TESTING 
William A. Mehrens 
Michigan State University 
In this chapter the author presents the legal setting for licensure testing, I 
discusses the role of various professional standards and codes (i.e., the EEOC 
Uniform Guidelines, 1978, and the AERA/APA/NCME Standards, 1985), pre-
sents some of the pertinent rulings from several court decisions, and makes 
inferences about future changes in professional standards and their potential 
impact on licensure test development. 
There necessarily is some minor overlap with the material in this chapter and 
some other chapters in this book. There is a brief discussion of the differences 
between licensure, certification. and employment testing and how those differ-
ences relate to the professional standards and court cases. It is necessary to 
mention some concepts such as task analysis, validity, and cut scores when 
discussing the professional standards and the court cases. However, these concepts 
are not dealt with in the depth that occurs in later chapters. 
THE LEGAL SETTING 
Licensure and certification tests are high-stakes tests and those considering 
using or constructing such tests should be aware of previous case law regarding 
Portions of this chapter have been adapted from an article by Mehrens, W.A. and Popham, 
W.J . (1992). How to evaluate the legal defensibil ity of high-stakes tests. Applied Measurement in 
Education, 5(3),265-283. Permission of the publ isher and Dr. Popham to use those portions has been 
obtained . Special appreciation is given to Dr. Kara Schmitt and Susan Boston for their ass istance in 
tracking clown many of the lega l documents used in writing this chapter. 
'The words "test" and "testing" are to be interpreted broadly as inc luding a variety of assessment 
procedures. 
From: LICENSURE TESTING: PURPOSES, PROCEDURES, AND PRACTICES, ed. James C. 
Impara (Lincoln, NE: Buros, 1995). Copyright © 1995, 2012 Buros Center for Testing. 
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such testing. Some generic legal issues are discussed first. In subsequent sections, 
the various professional standards and some court decisions are presented. 
Generic Legal Issues 
Existing case law is based on constitutional requirements- primarily the 14th 
Amendment- and statutory requirements- primarily Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. 
Constitutional Requirements: The 14th Amendment 
Two basic requirements of the U.S. Constitution's 14th Amendment are 
discussed: equal protection and due process. For a plaintiff to win under the equal 
protection analysis, it must be shown that there was intent to discriminate. In 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977) , 
the court stated that the following factors could be considered in establishing 
discriminatory intent: (a) historical background, (b) the specific sequence of events 
leading up to the challenged decision, (c) departures from normal procedural 
sequences, and (d) the legislative or administrative history. Nevertheless, to prove 
discriminatory intent, one court has ruled that it must be shown that the user of the 
test "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ' because of' 
not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group" (Personnel 
Administrator v. Feeney, 1979, at 4656). Another court has stated that: 
An action does not violate the equal protection clause simply because the decision 
maker knows that it wi ll have a disparate impact on racial or ethnic groups. (United 
States v. LULAC, 1986, p. 646) 
It is difficult to prove intent. As a consequence, most plaintiffs would prefer 
basing their cases on the Civil Rights Acts, which do not require proof of 
discriminatory motive. 
The due process provisions of the Constitution relate to substantive and proce-
dural due process. Substantive due process requires a legitimate relationship between 
a requirement and the purpose. This legitimate relationship is easier to establish than 
the business necessity requirement of the Civil Rights Acts. In fact, for licensure and 
certification challenges Herbsleb, Sales, and Overcast (1985) concluded that: 
the rationality standard is so lenient that we were unable to find a single case where 
an examination was successfully challenged on this basi s. (p. 1169) 
Procedural due process requires fairness in the way things are done. In testing 
cases, this means that there must be advance notice of the requirement, an 
opportunity for hearings/appeals, and that the hearings must be conducted fairly. A 
licensure or certification testing program should not be implemented without 
paying careful attention to these procedures. It should be pointed out that if a 
plaintiff wins on procedural grounds, he/she does not necessarily get a license. 
However, some additional procedure- such as a hearing- must be applied. 
Statutory Requirements: The Civil Rights Acts 
The 1964 Civil Rights Act was a general federal statute prohibiting discrimi-
nation in employment. When first enacted it pertained to employment in the private 
2. LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL BASES 35 
sector, but it was extended in 1972 to employment practices in educational 
institutions. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed to reverse parts of several 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that were unfavorable to employment complaints. 
There is some debate about whether licensure and certification procedures are to be 
considered employment practices and whether the Civil Rights Acts apply to such 
processes. This is discussed in more detail later. 
The Acts prohibit two kinds of discrimination: disparate treatment and 
disparate impact. Disparate treatment involves overt discrimination- where em-
ployers treat some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, 
religion, or national origin. The plaintiff has the initial burden of establish ing that 
disparate treatment occurred. Most case law related to the Civi l Rights Acts 
regarding testing is based on disparate impact rather than disparate treatment. 
Disparate impact does not require evidence of subjective discriminatory intent, 
but refers to employment practices that are ostensibly neutral in their treatment, yet 
result in protected groups being hired at a lower rate than unprotected groups. It 
is the plaintiff' s responsibility to show disparate impact, but it is the responsibility 
of the user (e.g., employer or licensure board) to maintain documentation regarding 
disparate impact (see Chance v. Board of Examiners, 1971, 1972). The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 states that the plaintiff must demonstrate that each particular chal-
lenged process (e.g., written test, subtest, oral exam, performance appraisal) causes 
a disparate impact unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the decision-making 
elements cannot be analyzed separately. (This emphasis on each component may 
have implications for scoring procedures-should one use part scores or total 
scores- and conjunctive versus compensatory decision making.) 
There exists some debate about what statistics to use and what groups should 
be considered in the statistical analysis to show disparate impact. Regarding the 
relevant groups, the general conclusion is that the proper comparison is between the 
proportions of the groups in the qualified population in the relevant job market 
(Wards Cove Packing Co., 1989; Civi l Rights Act of 1991). For the statistical 
analysis, the Uniform Guidelines2 (EEOC, 1978) suggest a four-fifths rule. This 
means that the percent of protected group applicants hired should be at least 80% 
of the percent of unprotected group applicants hired. Others prefer a statistical 
inference test to discern if an observed disparity between protected and unprotected 
groups is statistically significant (e.g., Hazelwood, 1977). Because the issue of 
impact is not one of test construction and use, per se, we will not discuss it further. 
However, interested readers may wish to consult the literature concerning this issue 
(see, e.g., Meier, Sacks, & Zabell , 1984). 
In cases where there has been a showing of disparate impact on members of 
a protected group for a particular employment practice, the burden of proof shifts 
to the defendants and requires them to demonstrate that the use of the test (or other 
assessment procedure) constitutes a business necessity. (Employers do not need to 
defend those parts of the process that do not show disparate impact.) This means 
that the particular challenged tests (or subtests) must be shown to be job-related and 
' The Guidelines is a s in gle work. However, for smoothness in reading it will be treated as a 
plural noun. 
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to have been professionally developed. If a test is job-related and professionally 
developed, it can be used even if there is disparate impact unless the plaintiffs can 
show that there exists an equally effective alternative selection procedure that results 
in less adverse impact. Although there were some Supreme Court decisions in 1988 
and 1989 that lessened the burden of proof of the defendants to show business 
necessity, the 1991 Civil Rights Act reestablished this requirement. 
Title VII and Employment, Licensure, and Certification Testing 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the purposes of licensure and certification 
tests are different from the purpose of employment tests. The function of licensure 
is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public. There is some debate 
about whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act applies to licensure tests. Some 
attorneys (e.g., Phillips, 1991; Pyburn, 1990; Rebell, 1986) have suggested that 
Title VII does not apply to state licensing agencies and their tests. Rulings in bar 
examination cases such as Tyler v. Vickery (1975, 1976) and Woodward v. Virginia 
Board of Bar Examiners (1976, 1979) support this position. For example, one court 
stated that: 
T itle VII does not apply by its terms ... because the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners 
is neither an "employer," an "employment agency," nor a " labor organization" 
within the meaning of the statute. (TyLer v. Vickery, 1976, p. 1096) 
Smith and Hambleton (1990) concluded that: 
Most courts have been unwilling to extend Title VII ... to licensure examinations. 
(p. 8) 
Shimberg (1990) reached the same conclusion. Others believe that at least for 
teacher licensure, the State can be viewed as an employer (see Kuehn, Stallings, & 
Holland, 1990). Freeman, Hess, and Kasik (1985) discuss why teacher licensure 
may be unique. They suggest that: 
the history of certification in most states indicates that certification has been 
intimately interwoven in the employment process. (p. 14) 
They argue further that: 
Teaching as a profession is somewhat peculiar because teachers are certified or 
licensed to work exclusively in institutions that are created, maintained, and more 
or less financed by the state. (p. 23) 
The above quote is not precisely true because many private school, parochial 
school, and home school teachers are licensed. Nevertheless, some courts may 
view it as a relevant argument. 
Based, in part, upon the number of teacher certification test cases filed under 
Title VII, and the number of employment testing cases cited as relevant precedent 
in teacher certification test litigation, Kuehn, Stallings, and Holland (1990) believe 
Title VII does apply to teacher licensure. They suggest that: 
If the Courts treat teacher certificat ion tests as employee selection procedures, we 
are compelled to construct them and defend them as employee selection proce-
dures. (p. 2 I) 
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The problem with the above quote is that it is widely recognized that licensure 
tests serve different purposes from employment tests and this should result in 
different test construction and validation procedures. One difference is that a 
person is employed to do a specific job whereas a license allows the person to 
engage in diverse jobs. Freeman et al. recognized this problem and concluded that: 
examining certification requirements to determine their job-relatedness becomes 
an almost hopeless task. ( 1985, p. 25) 
The EEOC Un(form Guidelines address this whole issue, but the statements are 
not decisive. The Guidelines state that "licensing and certification are covered ' to 
the extent' that licensing and certification may be covered by Federal equal 
employment opportunity law" (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
[EEOC], 1978, p. 38294). They further state that: 
Voluntary certification boards, where certification is not required by law, are not 
users ... with respect to their certifying functions and therefore are not subject to 
these guidelines. If an employer relies upon such certification in making employ-
ment decisions, the employer is the user and must be prepared to justify, under 
Federal law, that reliance as it would any other selection procedure. (1978, p. 
38294) 
Thus, if an employer used the results of a certification test for promotion, or 
a differential salary, it would be used as an employment exam and be subject to 
Title VII. For example, consider the proposed certification tests of the National 
Board of Professional Teaching Standards. These are intended to be voluntary in 
the sense that licensed teachers will not have to take them to maintain their licenses. 
However, if a state or local district chose to reward certified teachers with 
additional salary, that may be considered an employment decision and the Civil 
Rights Acts (Title VII) might apply. But it would apply to the state or local unit 
that uses the test for decision making. 
The issue of the relevance of Title VII to licensure and certification tests is 
important because Title VII calls for a business necessity requirement, which is 
considered harder to demonstrate than the legitimate relationship requirement that 
would otherwise apply to licensure tests. Because there is some disagreement about 
whether (or under what circumstances) licensure and certification testing programs 
are subject to the Civil Rights Acts requirements, this chapter discusses guidelines 
for both types of settings. This author's view is that most licensure and certification 
testing programs should not be ruled as employment programs, but others, used in 
different fashions, might be. 
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AND CODES 
There are several sets of professional standards and codes that should be 
cons idered when constructing a licensure or certification examination. The two 
major ones are the Standardsfor Educational and Psychological Testing (American 
Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, & Na-
tional Council on Measurement in Education [AERAI APA/NCMEJ, 1985), hereaf-
ter referred to as the Standards; and the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection 
Procedures (EEOC, 1978), hereafter referred to as the Guidelines. 
38 MEHRENS 
Prior to discussing these standards and codes, it should be emphasized that both 
the Standards and the Guidelines are somewhat dated. Both documents explicitly 
recognize that they need to be interpreted keeping this datedness factor in mind. 
The Standards3 note that they are concerned "with a field that is evolving" (AERAI 
APA/NCME, 1985, p. 2) and the Guidelines point out that "they will have to be 
interpreted in light of changing factual , legal, and professional circumstances" 
(EEOC, 1978, p. 38292). In a later section , current psychometric views and 
potential future directions in the field and how they may impact legal issues and 
future revisions of the Standards and Guidelines are discussed. 
AERAIAPAINCME Standards 
The 1985 Standards constitute the fifth in a series of documents from the three 
sponsoring organizations regarding the development and use of tests and they 
supersede the previous documents. 
In general, the Standards advocates that, within feas ible lim its, the necessary 
technical information be made available so that those involved in policy debate 
may be fully informed. The Standards does not attempt to provide psychometric 
answers to policy questions. (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. I) 
The Standards are divided into four parts. Part I covers technical standards for 
test construction and evaluation. Included in this part are chapters on such topics 
as validity, reliability, and norming, score comparability, and equating. Part II 
covers standards for test use. The chapter on licensure and certification testing is 
of major importance to readers of this volume although the chapter on employment 
testing is mentioned. Part III covers standards for particular applications and the 
chapter on testing the di sabled is particularly important. Finally, Part IV presents 
standards for administrative procedures. 
The Standards point out that their use in litigation is inevitable, but that 
"professional judgment .. . always plays an essential role in determining the 
relevance of particular standards in particular situations" (AERA/APA/NCME, 
1985, p. 2). Further, it is stressed that: 
evaluat ing the acceptability of a test or test app lication does not rest on the literal 
satisfaction of every primary standard in thi s document, and acceptability cannot 
be determined by using a check list. (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 2) 
Although the Standards represent an "official" guideline to be judgmentally 
followed, it should be recognized that there is less than consensus in the psychometric 
community about various components of the Standards. For example, regarding the 
concept of test validity, Linn, comments on the Joint Committee's attempt 
to carry this unified view of validity a bit further, but not, I might add, without 
significant objection from a number of people .... A number of reviewers consid-
ered such a requirement to be overly demanding. (Linn, 1984, p. 4) 
Shimberg has stated that the writers of the Standards did not obtain consen-
sus "among all those who prepare and use licensing and certification tests 
3The Slandards, like the Guidelines, is a single work. However. For smoothness in reading it also 
will be treated as a plural noun . 
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regarding what constitutes acceptable professional practice in these areas" (1990, 
p. 13). 
In spite of the above comments, the Standards are (correctly in my opinion) 
used as a guide in the development of a licensure or certification test, and one 
should try to follow the relevant standards. The subsections that follow discuss 
some of the most pertinent standards from various chapters of the Standards. 
Valid ity Standards 
The validity chapter of the Standards states that "validity is the most important 
consideration in test evaluation" (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 9) and presents 25 
different standards regarding validity. 
Certainly many of the standards in this chapter are relevant. However, it is 
clear that not even all of these are relevant for any given test development/use 
project. For example, in the validity chapter, Standard 1.1 states that "evidence of 
validity should be presented for the major types of inferences for which the use of 
a test is recommended" (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 13). By implication, and by 
the comment following the standard, it is obvious that one would not have to gather 
all the types of validity evidences that are addressed in the Standards for any 
particular use. The separate chapters in Part II on various uses of tests make that 
clear also. 
Validity is a technical area where the field has changed its nomenclature, if 
indeed not its approach. The Standards state that validity 
refers to the appropriateness, meaningfulness, and usefulness of the specific 
inferences made from test scores. Test validation is the process of accumu lating 
evidence to support such inferences. (AERAI APA/NCME, 1985, p. 9) 
Although, as the Standards point out, validity is a unitary concept, evidence 
may be accumulated in many ways and psychometricians have traditionally 
categorized the various ways into content-related, criterion-related, and construct-
related evidence of validity although "rigorous distinctions between the categories 
are not possible" (p. 9). As the Standards suggest: 
evidence identified usually with the criterion-related or content-related categories 
... is relevant also to the construct-related category. (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, 
p.9) 
Because content-related validity evidence is likely to be one type of validity 
evidence that will be gathered, it seems important to consider the validity standards 
that relate particularly to content-related evidence. Standard 1.3 relates indirectly 
and Standard 1.6 directly to content-related evidence. 
Standard 1.3: Whenever interpretation of subscores, score differences, or profiles 
is suggested, the evidence justifying such interpretation shou ld be made explicit. 
Where composite scores are developed, the basis and rationale for weighting the 
subscores should be given. (Primary) (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 14). 
Standard 1.6: When content-related evidence serves as a significant demonstration 
of validity for a particular test use, a clear definition of the universe represented, 
its relevance to the proposed test use, and the procedures followed in generating 
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test content to represent that universe should be described . When the content 
sampling is intended to reflect criticality rather than representativeness, the 
rationale for the re lative emphasis given to critical factors in the universe should 
also be described carefu lly. (Primary) (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985 , p. 14) 
The last sentence in the above quoted standard is particularly important 
because, as will become more clear when discussing Chapter 11 of the Standards, 
one often wishes for a critical rather than representative domain in licensure testing. 
Reliability Standards 
The reliability chapter of the Standards presents 12 different standards. Some 
of the more important reliability standards that should be attended to are as follows: 
Standard 2. 1: For each total score, subscore, or combination of scores that is 
reported, estimates of re levant reli abilities and standard errors of measurement 
should be provided ... (Primary) (p. 20) 
Standard 2.10: Standard errors of measurement should be reported at critical score 
levels. Where cut scores are specified for selection or classification, the standard 
errors of measurement should be reported for score levels at or near the cut score. 
(Secondary) (p. 22) 
Standard 2. 12: For dichotomous decisions, estimates should be provided of the 
percentage of test takers who are c lassified in the same way on two occasions or 
on alternate forms of the test. (Conditional) (AERAI APA/NCME, 1985, p. 23) 
Test Development and Revision Standards 
The chapter on test development and revision presents 25 different standards. 
The standards primarily relate to building a test in a correct fashion. The major 
overriding standard in this chapter is Standard 3. 1, which states that "Tests and 
testing programs should be developed on a sound scientific bas is" (p. 25). Standard 
3.2 states that the definition of the universe or domain must be described. Many 
of the other standards in this chapter would also be appropriate for li censure and 
certification examinations. 
Scaling, Norming, Score Comparability, and Equating Standards 
It is certainly important that there be score comparability and equating of tests 
given at different times for licensure and certification exams, and the nine standards 
presented in this chapter relevant to those issues should be considered in test 
development. The standard most relevant for licensure tests is Standard 4.8 which 
speaks to the content and statistical requirements for anchor test items if an anchor 
test design is used for equating. 
Setting the Cut Score 
For licensure tests, the precision of the equating at the cut store is of primary 
importance. There is no chapter in the Standards directly related to this issue and 
the Standards do not make any recommendation regarding specific standard setting 
procedures. However, they do suggest that the method and rationale of setting the 
cut score, as well as the qualifications of the judges, should be documented (see 
Standards 6.9 and 10.9). 
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Standards Specific to Employment Testing 
Chapter 10 of the standards is on employment testing. If a developer/user of 
a licensure or certification test believes that it will be regarded by the courts as an 
employment examination, then attention should be given to the standards in this 
chapter. As mentioned above, this author does not consider licensure tests to be 
employment tests, but some uses of certification tests (promotion, differential tasks 
or differential salaries based on the tests) may place them in that category . The 
major difference between the standards for employment testing and licensure and 
certification testing is that employment testing standards place more emphasis on 
criterion-related validity evidence. 
Professional and Occupational Licensure and Certification Standards 
Chapter 11 of the Standards focuses directly on professional and occupational 
licensure and certification examinations. As the Standards point out, "several 
hundred occupations are now regulated by state governments. Many other occupa-
tions are certified by nongovernmental agencies" (p. 63). The Standards discuss 
the different purposes of employment and licensure examinations already discussed 
in this book, and point out the implications of those differences for various issues 
of validity. For licensure and certification, the focus is on necessary skills and 
knowledge, whereas the employer may wish to maximize productivity. The 
Standards make clear that: 
Investigations of criterion -related validity are more problematic in the context 
of li censure or certification than in many employment settings. Not all those 
certified or licensed are necessarily hired; those hired are likely to be in a 
variety of job assignments with many different employers, and some may be 
self-employed. These factors often make traditional studies that gather crite-
rion-related evidence of validity infeasible ... . For licensure and certification, 
... primary reliance must usually be placed on content evidence ... " (AERA/APAI 
NCME, 1985, p. 63) 
Another distinction is that although an employment test typically should 
cover the totality of the knowledge, skills, and abilities desirable on the job, the 
content domain of a licensure test should be limited to the "knowledge and skills 
necessary to protect the public" (p. 64). Note that "abilities" was left out of this 
quote. Linn (1984) and Kane (1984) have made the same point. There is at least 
some legal precedent to suggest that a licensure examination need not evaluate the 
full range of skills desirable to practice a profession (Eisdorfer & Tractenberg, 
1977, p. 119). 
Although the Standards appropriately emphasize the importance of content-
related validity evidence over criterion-related or construct validity evidence for 
licensure tests, builders or users of licensure tests should not think they "have it 
easy" in constructing licensure tests that meet the Standards. The requirements of 
content validity are quite explicit and demanding. 
Standard 11.1: The content domain to be covered by a licensure or certifi cation 
test should be defined clearly and explained in terms of the importance of the 
content for competent performance in an occupation. A rationale shou ld be 
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provided to support a claim that the knowledge or ski lls being assessed are 
required for competent performance in an occupation and are consistent with the 
purpose fo r which the licens ing or certificat ion program was instituted . (Primary) 
(AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 64) 
The comment for Standard 11.1 points out that "job analyses provide the 
primary basis for defining the content domain," that "the emphasis for licensure and 
certification is limited appropriately to knowledge and skills necessary to protect 
the public," and that "ski lls that may be important to success but are not directly 
related to the purpose of li censure (i.e., protecting the public) should not be 
included in a licensing exam" (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 64). 
Two final standards from this chapter seem particularly relevant. 
Standard 11 .4: Test takers who fail a test should, upon request, be to ld their score 
and the minimum score required to pass the tes t. Test takers should be given 
information on their performance in parts of the test for which separate scores or 
reports are produced and used in the decis ion process. (Primary) (p. 65) 
Standard 11.5: Rules and procedures used to combine scores or other assessments 
to determine the overall outcome should be reported to test takers preferably before 
the test is administered. (Secondary) (AERA/APA/NCME, 1985, p. 65) 
The comment for Standard 11.5 points out that: 
In some cases candidates may be required to score above a specified minimum on 
each of several tests. In other cases the pass-fai l decision may be based solely on 
a total composite score. (AERAI APA/NCME, 1985 , p. 65) 
These last two standards and the comment for Standard 11 .5 need to be 
considered along with Standard 2. 1 quoted above. If the test is not unidimensional , 
the subscores provide potentially useful information for failing candidates who 
wish to direct their subsequent review and study to their areas of weakness. If these 
subscores are reported for remediation purposes and are not used in a conjunctive 
model but are simply used in a total composite score in a compensatory model, it 
is debatable whether the scores have been used "in the decision process." They 
have not been used in the licensure decision, but may be used by the fai led 
candidate for remediation purposes. In writing specifically about teacher licensure 
examinations , Mehrens has suggested that: 
Because subscores are not typicall y used in teacher licensure decisions they would 
not need to be reported. If they are reported they might be used as study guides 
by candidates who fa iled and thus it would be usefu l to report their reliabi li ties and 
standard errors. The re liabilities are freq uently low and candidates should 
recogni ze their limitations as study guides . However, it should be stressed that low 
subscore reliabilities are irrelevant in litigation regarding the legality of using the 
total score for licensure decisions [emphasis added]. (1 990, p. 85) 
It seems reasonable to generalize from this point to any licensure examination 
use where the decision is based on a total composite score. One final point deserves 
emphasis. The quoted comment accompanying Standard 11.5 suggests that it is 
appropriate to base pass-fai l dec ision "solely on a total composite score." Although 
this author agrees with that position, a common statement heard from expert 
witnesses for plaintiffs is that one should not make a decision on only a single piece 
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of data. Obviously, that stated opinion ignores the fact that there was probably a 
sequential decision-making model employed requiring other acceptable data on 
additional variables prior to being allowed to sit for the licensure examination, and 
it ignores this specific standard that specifically accepts making a decision solely 
on a composite score. 
Standards on Testing Individuals with Disabil ities 
Chapter 14 of the Standards presents eight standards for testing individuals 
with disabilities. With the passing of the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990), 
which became effective in 1992, there has been much discussion regarding what 
accommodations need to be made for individuals with claimed disabilities. This 
issue has been considered in depth in other publications. For example, Millman, 
Mehrens, and Sackett address this issue for the New York Bar Examination in detail 
(1993). Clearly, there is some obligation to allow individuals with physical 
disabilities to be accommodated when the knowledge and skills needed for 
licensure are not the specific physical skills which are being accommodated. 
Probably the biggest areas of concern are with those who claim learning disabi lities. 
These are hard to classify and most classification schemes result in a large number 
of false positives. Whether correctly or incorrectly classified, there is the issue of 
what is a fair accommodation for individuals with a cognitive disability when the 
job in question demands cognitive functioning. The largest specific issue probably 
relates to the amount of time extension that should be given to individuals with 
disabilities. If the job in question demands primarily physical skills, then it would 
be reasonable to grant accommodations to those with learning disabilities, but it 
may not be reasonable to grant them to those with physical disabilities . 
Some of the major points made in the eight standards are as follows: 
Standard 14.1: People who modify tests for handicapped people should have 
available to them psychometric expertise for so doing. (p. 79) 
Standard 14.2: Until tests have been validated for people who have specific 
handicapping conditions, test publishers shou ld issue cautionary statements in 
manuals and elsewhere regarding confidence in interpretations based on such test 
scores. (p. 79) 
Standard 14.5: Empirical procedures should be used whenever possible to 
estab li sh time limits for modified forms of timed tests rather than simply allowing 
handicapped test takers a multiple of the standard time. (p.79) 
Standard 14.6: When feasible, the val idity and reliability of tests adm inistered to 
people with various handicapping conditions should be investigated and reported 
by the agency or publisher that makes the modification. (AERA/APA/NCME, 
1985 , p. 80) 
EEOC Uniform Guidelines 
The Uniform Guidelines (EEOC, 1978) are a set of gu idelines on employee 
selection procedures that have been adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, the Civil Service Commission, the Department of Justice, and the 
Department of Labor. In addition to being quite dated, there is, as has been 
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mentioned, some debate about whether (or when) they might apply to licensure and 
certification exams. As is stated: 
These guidelines apply to tests and other selection procedures which are used as 
a basis for any employment decision. Employment decisions include but are not 
limited to hiring, promotion, demotion, membership (for example in a labor 
organization), referral, retention, and licensing and certification, to the extent that 
licensing and certification may be covered by Federal equal employ ment opportu-
nity law. (EEOC, 1978, p. 38296) 
They also state that: 
Voluntary certi fication boards, where certification is not required by law, are not 
users as defined ... with respect to their certifying functions and therefore are not 
subject to these guidelines. If an employer relies upon such certification in making 
employment decisions, the employer is the user and must be prepared to justify, 
under Federal law, that reliance as it would any other selection procedure. (EEOC, 
1978, p. 38294) 
Whether or not the Guidelines apply in licensure, it is important to realize 
that they "have been given great weight by the courts in Equal Protection as well 
as Title VII cases" (Eisdorfer & Tractenberg, 1977, p. 121; see also, Rebell, 
1990a, p. 347). 
Under the Guidelines, to use a measure that produces adverse impact, the 
employer 
must justify the use of the procedure on grounds of 'business necessity.' This 
normally means that it must show a clear relation between performance on the 
selection procedure and performance on the job. (EEOC, 1978, p. 3829 1) 
Although users need not validate procedures which do not have an adverse 
impact, 
if one way of using a procedure (e.g. ranking) results in greater adverse impact than 
another way (e.g. pass/fail), the procedure must be validated for that use. (EEOC, 
1978, p. 38294) 
There are no major contradictions between the Guidelines and the Standards, 
however, the Guidelines are more explicit than the Standards on some dimensions 
(e.g., they require that any cutoff score be justified by reference to the "need for a 
trustworthy and efficient work force" [EEOC, 1978, p. 38291], and that when 
"cutoff scores are used, they should normally be set so as to be reasonable and 
consistent with normal expectations of acceptable proficiency within the work 
force" [ EEOC, 1978, p. 38298]). The Guidelines terminology of "normal expec-
tations" clearly suggests a judgmental approach for setting a cutoff score. How-
ever, the Guidelines suggest that rank ordering requires substantial evidence of 
validity and a reasonable expectation that small differences in scores would reflect 
real differences in job performance. 
The Guidelines address the three types of validity evidence and state that 
"users may rely upon criterion-related validity studies, content validity studies or 
construct validity studies" (EEOC, 1978, p. 38298). They recognize the lack of a 
clear distinction between types of validity evidence and try to address the borderline 
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between content validity and construct validity. As an example, the Guidelines 
state that for typing, a typing test: 
is justi fiable on the basis of content validity because it is a sample of an important 
or critical part of the job ... but [the Guidelines) do not allow the validation of a test 
measuring a construct such as "judgment" by a content validity strategy. (EEOC, 
1978, p. 38292) 
Other quotes from the Guidelines relevant to validity are as follows: 
Any validity study should be based upon a review of information about the job for 
which the selection procedure is to be used. (p. 38300) 
A selection procedure can be supported by a content validity strategy to the extent 
that it is a representative sample of the content of the job. (p. 38302) 
A selection procedure based upon inferences about mental processes cannot be 
supported solely or primarily on the basis of content validity. (EEOC, 1978, p. 
38302) 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Guidelines stress the importance of 
record keeping and documentation. 
Users of selection procedures .. . should maintain and have available for each job 
information on adverse impact of the selection process fo r that job and, where it 
is determined a selection process has an adverse impact, evidence of validi ty ... Where 
a total selecti on process for a job has an adverse impact, the user should maintain 
and have available records or other information showing which components have 
an adverse impact. (EEOC, 1978, 38303). 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS 
There are differences in case law and test construction processes between 
employment and licensure testing and the case law precedents will be discussed 
separately. For each type of test, some of the pivotal cases are identified and what 
made those cases important is described. In generalizing from the rulings in these 
cases, it should be pointed out that a legal case is binding only on lower courts in 
the same jurisdiction. For example, Federal Supreme Court rulings are binding on 
all other Federal Courts, but an Appeals Court ruling in, for instance, the 5th Circuit 
would be binding only on lower courts in that circuit. Also, the decisions are 
binding only on cases that are factuall y similar. Nevertheless, even cases not 
binding may be broadly instructive. 
Employment Cases 
The Griggs v. Duke Power Company case (1971) was the first landmark case 
dealing with job-related testing. The court ruled that in employment testing in 
private industry the defendants must show the job relatedness of the test. "Broad 
and general testing dev ices ... as fixed measures of capacity" were barred in 
employment testing (Griggs, 1971 , p. 433). In Albermarle Paper Company v. 
Moody (1 975), it was held that the EEOC Guidelines (revised in 1978) were the 
fundamental benchmark for assessing Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act job 
relatedness requirements . These Guidelines constituted the administrative interpre-
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tation of the act by the enforcing agency and "consequently are entitled to great 
deference" (Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 1971,401 U.S., at 433-434). Chance 
v. Board of Examiners (1972) established ajob relatedness precedent for tests used 
with public employees as well as private employees. 
Thus, it is clear that employers can be challenged regarding the job-relatedness 
of their employment practices. When challenged, employers must show that their test 
development procedures followed acceptable professional practices, with the EEOC 
Guidelines being considered an important guide. However, in Guardians Association 
of N. Y. City v. Civil Service Commission (1980), the court ruled that the Guidelines 
adopted too rigid an approach in the selection of validation techniques and that it was 
inconsistent with Title VII's endorsement of professionally developed tests. The 
Court basically considered content vaHdation strategies to be acceptable for a test that 
assessed observable abilities. The court stated that content validation should not be 
rejected just because the abilities measured could be classified as constructs. 
In an earlier decision (Washington v. Davis, 1976) the Supreme Court accepted 
the use of a verbal skill s test for entry into police training even though its use had 
adverse impact because the scores correlated with performance in the training 
program and that training program completion is a prerequisite to employment. It 
should be mentioned that: 
Title VII standards were not app lied in Washington v. Davis because the statute 
was not applicable to federal employees when the case was initially fi led. (Cohen, 
1989, p. 240) 
However, the Court commented that had the job-relatedness requirements of 
Griggs or Albermarle Paper been applied, the correlation with the training program 
would have been sufficient validation. 
In a fairly recent court decision (Richardson v. Lamar County Board of 
Education, 1989, 1991) a school district was challenged for using the Alabama 
Initial Teacher Certification Test. This test was originally intended as a licensure 
examination. Thus, although the case was technically an employment case, it may 
have implications for licensure examinations. The judge ruled against the district's 
use of the test. Judge Thompson's decision contained a fairly extensive analysis of 
perceived problems in test development and standard setting processes in the 
Alabama Initial Teacher Certification Test. Judge Thompson ruled that: 
first try failure statistics can be used for determining the extent of 
adverse impact because initial failure is a discrete injury (even though 
another court had previously ruled otherwise-see United States v. 
LULAC, 1986); 
outside experts should have been retained to monitor the test developer's 
work; 
all items should have been reviewed by committee members and 
suggested changes in items should not have been ignored by the test 
developer; 
the developer should have conducted empirical bias studies (even 
though for many of the tests the sample sizes were small); 
• the cut scores were too high; 
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• failure to use a backup cut score method was not unprofessional; 
a developer may change methodology across time without this consti-
tuting an admission of error; and 
a court should not eschew an idealistic view of test validity evidence, 
but neither should it apply an "anything goes" approach. 
Although this author does not agree with all of Judge Thompson's interpreta-
tions of the data in the case, the ruling does suggest that test developers should carry 
out their test construction tasks very carefully . 
Two recent U.S. Supreme Court rulings relate to the requirements for subjec-
tive assessments. Basically , the rulings in both cases were that nonobjective 
assessments are subject to legal scrutiny under the disparate impact analysis of Title 
VII. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust (1 988), it was ruled that the Griggs 
standards would apply to subjective testing processes such as interviews. The court 
wished to prevent employers from circumventing the Griggs standard by replacing 
tests with subjective assessments. However, there was sharp di spute among the 
Justices on how to apply the standards. A plurality of the court said the standards 
should be applied in a less rigorous manner in subjective testing. In the Wards Co ve 
Packing Co. v. Atonia (1989), a majority of the court agreed to less rigorous 
standards. Rebell (1990b) has suggested that: 
The net effect of Watson/Wards Cove might be said to constitute a broadening of 
Title VII 's reach but also a modification of its bite. (p. 5) 
Nevertheless, courts will not accept an "anything goes" approach in subjective 
assessments. (See the discussion in the next section of a licensure case [Musgrove 
et ai. v. Board of Education for the State of Georgia et al.l, which was a case 
involving a subjective assessment process.) 
Licensure Cases 
Licensure testing may involve a conflict between two rights: social and 
individual. The tension between societal and individual rights is both a legal and 
a moral issue (McDonQugh & Wolf, 1988). No one denies that the public has a 
legitimate right to have competent individuals practicing in various occupations and 
profess ions. No one denies that individuals have the right to be protected from 
unfair employment practices. The trade-off between the two is where the contro-
versy lies. 
As mentioned, there is debate about the applicability of the Civil Rights Acts 
to licensure tests. However, there is a strong constitutional bas is for licensing. 
Reeves (1 984) states that: 
The constitutionality of requirements to take and pass qualifying examinations is 
firml y entrenched. (p. 65) 
This basis is stated in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar (1 975) as follows: 
The States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their 
boundaries, and that as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and 
other valid interests they have broad power to establish standards fo r licensing 
practitioners and regul ating the practice of professions. (p. 792) 
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Although a constitutional basis is well established, licensure tests must have a 
rational relationship to the occupation. However, as mentioned, this is relatively 
easy to establi sh. 
There are several court precedents for licensure. Most of these are for licensure 
to the Bar although in recent years there have been several teacher licensure cases. 
We begin our review of licensure cases with a very early decision on the licensure 
of doctors. In Dent v. State of West Virginia (1881), ruling in favor of the licensure 
requirement, the court declared, in part: 
The power of the state to provide for the general welfare of its people authorizes 
it to prescribe all such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure 
them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, as well as of deception 
and fraud .... The nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend 
primarily upon the judgment of the state as to their necessi ty. If they are 
appropriate to the calling or profession, and attainable by reasonable study or 
application, no objection to their validity can be raised because of their stringency 
or difficulty. (1881 , p. 114) 
In a massive review of the literature, Eisdorfer and Tractenberg (1977) 
suggested that: "In the post-1937 period, the standard of review has become even 
more relaxed than that stated in the Dent case" (p. 117). 
Given the thorough review by Eisdorfer and Tractenberg in their 1977 
chapter, this review jumps to a more recent case: United States v. State of North 
Carolina (1975, 1977). The United States brought a Title VII complaint against 
North Carolina for requiring a minimum score on the National Teacher Examina-
tion (NTE). The court record revealed that at least one teacher training institute 
had 
graduated functional illiterates and the court acknowledged that the state should 
have "the right to adopt academic requirements and written achievement tests 
designed and validated to disclose the minimum amount of knowledge necessary 
to effective teaching." However, the NTE was not designed for use in assessing 
inservice teachers, the cut-off score chosen was not validated for job performance, 
and the result was a disparate impact on blacks. (Cohen, 1989, p. 239) 
The court ruling was vacated in 1977 following the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Washington v. Davis regarding correlation with training programs and because a 
validation study was conducted for the NTE in North Carolina. 
The Tyler v. Vickery (1975 , 1976) case was a challenge against the constitu-
tionality of the Georgia Bar Examination. The decision is important for several 
reasons. First, as mentioned, it rejected the view that the EEOC Guidelines were 
appropriate for a bar examination. Related to cutoff scores it was ruled that: 
While the minimum passing score of 70 has no significance standing alone, it 
represents the examiners' cons idered judgment as to "minimum competence 
required to practice law." (p. 1102) 
The court also rejected the plaintiffs ' complaint that the examinations did not 
cover the full range of ski lls needed to practice law and it held that no review 
procedure was necessary because there was an opportunity to retake the examina-
tion within a reasonable time. 
2. LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL BASES 49 
An important early teacher licensure case was the United States v. the State of 
South Carolina (1977, 1978). In thi s case, it was ruled that the National Teacher 
Examination (NTE) could be used for both teacher certification (licensure) and 
determination of salary levels. This case followed Washington v. Davis, and the NTE 
was validated against teacher training programs and not actual job performance. It was 
held that the content validity study was adequate under Title VII (and constitutional) 
guidelines. One way this case differed from the original (prior to vacating) North 
Carolina case was that the state did both an extensive cutoff score study and content 
validation study. Cohen (1989) has concluded that: 
When teacher certificati on tests are profess ionally developed in good faith to 
insure teacher competency and are then validated as to content, they will be upheld 
by courts. The public interest in having at least minimally competent teachers 
seems to outweigh the disparate impact that has often resulted. (p. 242) 
An Alabama teacher licensure case was an example of a prolonged, complex 
litigation. A Basic Profess ional Studies Test and 45 tests for different teaching 
specializations were constructed and administered by the National Evaluation Systems 
(NES). A class action suit was brought against the state on behalf of all African-
Americans who had been (or would be) denied certification because of failure to pass 
the tests. After considerable discussion, a settlement was approved by the court. 
Subsequently , the Alabama State Board of Education wished to back out of the 
settlement. After much legal manipUlation, the United States Court of Appeals ruled 
that the original agreement was enforceable. The settlement incorporated the idea of 
the Golden Rule (1 980) settlement that required items with minimum racial differ-
ences to be used first in any test. (The Golden Rule approach to choosing items has 
been almost unanimously viewed by measurement professionals as one that will result 
in psychometrically inferior examinations.) At any rate, the Alabama case was 
decided on procedural grounds rather than on the merits of the proposed certification 
programs. Nevertheless, while the settlement issue was being debated in the courts, 
the case was tried on its merits, but the judge never issued a ruling. Although the 
Richardson employment case discussed earlier may provide some clues regarding how 
the judge might have ruled, it is possible that previous legal precedent for licensure 
cases may have caused the judge to rule differently in a licensure case than he would 
have in the employment case. 
Two licensure cases with important implications for testing are the State of Texas 
v. Project Principle (1 987), and United States v. LULA C (1986). In the Project 
Principle case, use of the Texas Examination of Current Administrators and Teachers 
(TECAT) was ruled constitutional. It was held that there was no impair ment of a 
contract ri ght because teaching certificates are licenses, not contracts; state legislatures 
may change licensing requirements retroactively; and that teacher testing was a 
rational means of achieving legitimate State objectives, hence was not fundamentally 
unfair. Also, it was ruled that due process was not violated because applicants had a 
right to retake the test prior to being decertified. The court ruled that: 
teacher tes ting is a rational means of achiev ing the legitimate state objective of 
ensuring that public school educators meet specified standards of competency. 
( 1987, p. 391) 
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In the LULAC case, the use of the Pre-Professional Skills Test (PPST) was 
upheld. The court noted that the state had considered other alternative tests before 
selecting the PPST, and that a validation study had been conducted which surveyed 
Texas educators regarding their beliefs about whether the skills measured by the 
PPST were necessary for success in teacher education programs and in teaching. 
The court agreed with the Washington v. Davis (1976) decision that a test only need 
show a relationship to the effects of a required training program, not the eventual 
competence of individuals on the job. Further, as noted earlier, the court held that 
because applicants are permitted to retake the test, and that the passing rate for 
minority-group students was increasing, "the ultimate impact of the PPST on the 
number of minority teachers in the State has not been assessed" (United States v. 
Lulac, 1986, p. 643). With respect to the issue of due process, the court held that 
the legislative process gave adequate notice: 
When the legislature enacts a law, or a state agency adopts a regulation, that affects 
a general class of persons, all of those persons have received procedural due 
process by the legislative process itself and they have no right to individual 
attention. (United States v. Lutac, 1986, p. 647) 
Finally, the court ruled that institutions of higher education were not required 
to lower standards to accommodate students who had been inadequately educated 
due to the state's historical dual school system. 
In administering its higher education systems ... a state ... has no constitutional or 
statutory obligation to suspend or lower valid academic standards to accommodate 
high school students who may be ill-prepared because of prior constitutional 
violations by its local and elementary school systems (United States v. Lutac, 
1986, p. 70 15). 
Musgrove et at. v. Board of Education for the State of Georgia, et al. (1991) 
was a case involving use of the Teacher Performance Assessment Instrument· 
(TPAI) for teacher licensure. Several points were made in that ruling that have 
important implications for licensure testing. One issue pertained to the rule that 
candidates were only allowed six attempts to pass the test. The court ruled that: 
a [sic] irrebuttable lifetime presumption of unfitness after failure to pass six 
"TPAI"s was arbitrary and capricious because no further education, training, 
experience, maturity or higher degree would enable such persons to become 
certified in Georgia. (Musgrove , 1991 , p. 3). 
Further, the court found that two competencies ("Interpersonal Skills" and 
"Helps Learners Develop Positive Self-Concepts") had indicators that were "so 
vague, ambiguous, indefinite, arbitrary and subjective as to fail to place a reason-
able person on notice of the standards of conduct expected" (Musgrove, 1991 , p. 
6). This court ruling focused on a performance instrument that had been carefully 
constructed and heavily researched. Those who are developing performance 
assessment instruments for high-stakes decisions should consider this court deci-
sion very carefully. 
Although the ruling not limiting the number of attempts to six is different from 
those to be discussed in the next paragraph, consideration should be given regarding 
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whether additional education should result in additional attempts being permitted. 
Performance standards should be defined with great care to minimize the possibility 
of their being considered vague, arbitrary, and subjective. 
Four courts have ruled in favor of limiting the number of chances an individual 
may have to take an exam. In Younger v. Colorado State Board of Law Examiners 
(1980) the court ruled in favor of limiting the number of examinations to three, and 
in Poats v. Givan (1981) a rule limiting the number of times an applicant could sit 
for the bar exam to four was declared legal. In Jones v. Board of Commissioners 
(1984) an Alabama rule limiting the number of times an applicant could take the 
bar exam did not create an irrebuttable presumption of incompetence. In Yu v. 
Clayton (1986) it was ruled that an RN applicant who had failed a licensure exam 
six times was ineligible for another chance until after recompleting an entire course 
of nursing studies. These four rulings are at odds with the Musgrove decision cited 
earlier. 
Several other cases are worthy of brief mention. One relates to the review of 
exams. In Balaklaw v. American Board of Anesthesiology, Inc. (1990) a plaintiff 
who failed brought suit requesting he be allowed to review his exam and answer 
sheet. The request was denied. This ruling was similar, in this respect, to the Tyler 
v. Vickery decision mentioned earlier. 
Finally, in Millet v. Hoisting Engineers' Licensing Div. it was ruled, for an oral 
exam, that: 
Failure to keep a record of the questions and answers has been held to be a 
constitutional violation because this deprives the failed applicant of any chance of 
showing that the examination was irrational and arbitrary or that the grading was 
in error. (1977, I 17 I) 
Conclusions Regarding Court Decisions 
A general conclusion seems to be that if tests are constructed according to 
procedures advocated in the Guidelines and Standards, they should withstand legal 
scrutiny. For employment cases, the key issue is validity. Rossein summarizes case 
law as follows: 
Courts readily uphold an employment practice if the employer can show that the 
practice actually enables the employer to screen out unqualified or less qualified 
candidates. (1992, p. L I) 
The issue, of course, is what kinds of, and how much, evidence is required. 
Content validity evidence has generally been considered sufficient. For example, in 
Jones et at. v. New York City Human Resources Administration (1975) it was stated 
that no case in that Circuit had held that criterion-related evidence was required to 
prove job-relatedness. 
Although, the Court argued in the Richardson decision that it should not 
eschew an idealistic view of test validity nor apply an "anything goes" approach, 
it is clear that the decision employed standards on the idealistic side of a middle 
position. That can perhaps be seen most clearly by looking specifically at the cut 
score issue. In general, the courts have accepted judgments regarding the cut score. 
In Tyler v. Vickery (1975) the court ruled that the cut score had been validated even 
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though there was no empirically demonstrated evidence because the score repre-
sented the examiners' "considered judgments" as to minimum competence re-
quired. In Guardians Association the exam was ruled as invalid, but regarding the 
cut score the court stated that: 
As with rank-ordering, a criterion-re lated study is not necessarily required: the 
e mployer might establi sh a valid cutoff score by using a professional estimate of 
the requi site ability levels, or, at the very least, by analyzing the test results to 
locate a logical "breakpoint" in the distribution of scores . (from Byham, 1983, p. 
J07) 
Pyburn (1984) concluded that a state may set the passing grade where it 
chooses because it is empowered to require high standards. He references Schware 
v. Board of Bar Examiners of State of New Mexico (1957) and Chance v. State Bar 
of California (1967). The Dent decision was quoted above. Although all these 
cases suggest that professional judgment is acceptable as a means of setting cut 
scores, if a judge is convinced the cut scores are too high, the ruling may be 
unfavorable. In the Richardson case discussed earlier, the court ruled that: 
the developer' s procedure yielded cut scores that were so astoundingly high that they 
signaled, on their face, an absence of correlation to minimum competence. ( 1989, p. 28) 
an inference as to competence will be meaningless if the cut score, or decis ion 
point, of the test does not also refl ect what practitioners in the field deem to be a 
minimally com.petent level ofper!onnance on that test. Again, the test developer's 
role in setting a cut score is to apply professionally accepted techniques that 
accurately marshal the judgment of practitioners. (1989, p. 32) 
One interesting point about the above quotes is that the judge seemed to 
support judgmental methods. Yet, when the test developers did apply what some 
supported as a professionally accepted technique, the judge contended that the cut 
scores were "astoundingly high." Certainly the attempt by the test constructors was 
to marshal the judgment of practitioners. Experts for the defendants did not believe 
the cut scores were too high. However, experts for the plaintiffs argued that the 
standards were too high. The judge obviously agreed. 
Rebell, in discussing three recent challenges that were settled or withdrawn, 
pointed out the very high pass rate for these tests. As he suggested: 
To the extent that fear of judicial intervention caused a lowering of otherwi se val id 
and appropriate cut scores, increased court involvement in evaluation matters is a 
worrisome prospect. ( 1990a, p. 35 1) 
Thus, although some judges will set very high (unrealistic?) standards for test quality, 
the bulk of the case law suggests most judges are reasonable in their expectations and 
rulings. In concluding this section, it seems appropriate to quote Pybum: 
To date, there have been very few successful challenges to licensing examinations 
on the grounds that the tests were "d iscriminatory" or were not "rationally related" 
to the purpose for which they were being used. (1990, p. 14) 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The Guidelines are quite out of date, but no revision is being planned; the 
Standards are somewhat dated and a revision is being planned; the 199 1 Civil 
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Rights Act, at the time of this writing, has had little chance to impact court rulings; 
and the Watson and Wards Cove rulings regarding subjective assessments are too 
recent to have had much impact on subsequent rulings. Thus, a variety of factors 
may impact how one should construct licensure tests and how courts may rule on 
their legality. Although the future is always difficult to predict, some discussion 
of possible future directions seems worthwhile. 
New Standards 
The revision of the Standards is being planned and, by the time thi s book is 
published, the individuals on the committee will be appointed and specific changes 
for the Standards will likely have been proposed. No revised standards are 
anticipated before 1996. As was mentioned, there was not total agreement among 
psychometricians regarding the 1985 Standards. Some thought they were not 
"tough" enough whereas others thought they set unreali stically high standards. 
Whether the revised standards will be more or less rigorous regarding tests used for 
licensure or certification will depend, in part, upon the views of the particular 
individuals appointed to the committee. 
Although the political/social interests and psychometric views of the individu-
als on the new Standards committee will likely have an impact on the Standards, 
just what that impact will be is unknown. What is known is that some views of the 
psychometric profession have changed and there is likely some general agreement 
on the wisdom of the changes. The 1985 Standards predicted some specific areas 
where 
new developments are particularly likely, such as gender-specific or combined-
gender norms, cultural bias, computer based test interpretations, validity generali -
zation, differential prediction, and fl agging test scores for people with handicapping 
conditions. (AERA/APAINCME, 1985, p. 2) 
Some of these new developments have been influenced by legislation. For 
example, the Civil Rights Act of 199 1 prohibits ethnic or gender norming for 
employment tests. Some of the other areas have not developed as much as was 
surmised when the 1985 Standards went to print. 
In my view, the major writings likely to influence the revised Standards are in 
the area of validity. As reported earlier, there was a movement in the 1985 
Standards to unify the notion of validity under the heading of construct validity. 
There has been continued writing in that area and the new Standards may well go 
further in that unifying direction than the current ones do. Whether there will be any 
major changes in the methodologies used to establish validity is more questionable. 
In my view, the methodologies available for gathering validity evidence have not, 
in fact, expanded much. One is still likely to use the methodologies that heretofore 
have been referred to as content, criterion-related, and construct validity evidences. 
There may, in fact, be a change in that all these methodologies are referred to as 
providing evidence regarding the construct validity of the measures. 
In addition to wishing to call all validity construct validity, there has been some 
suggestion that the notion of validity should extend beyond the accuracy of 
inferences made from the scores to encompass the social consequences of testing 
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(Messick, 1989; Shepard, 1993). It is unclear at the time of this writing whether that 
expansion of the meaning of the word "validity" will be widely accepted by the 
measurement community. For example, Wiley (1991) prefers to focus on the 
psychological processes intended to be measured rather than the use of the tests. In 
general, there is some concern that broadening the concept of validity into a 
consideration of social concerns will cause it to lose some of its scientific meaning. 
Nevertheless, whether consequences of test use become a part of the connotation of 
"validity," the measurement community has long noted the importance of considering 
the costs of false positives and false negatives and the new Standards are almost sure 
to emphasize the consideration of these costs more explicitly. It is hard to imagine that 
the costs of false positives would be taken lightly for licensure decisions. 
New Legislation 
Some aspects of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act have been discussed. Because both are reasonably recent, there is 
little legal precedent regarding what the impact of these will be. In this author's 
view, there will be little impact on licensure from the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
because it relates primarily to employment testing and it basically reaffirms the 
business necessity requirement that was the basis for many of the previous 
decisions . The only two decisions that would have allowed for a lessening of the 
business necessity requirement were the Watson and the Wards Cove cases. There 
will likely be some consideration of the Americans with Disabilities Act in the new 
Standards. Whether or not that occurs, test constructors and test users do need to 
attend to the necessity of providing appropriate accommodations for individuals 
with documented disabilities. 
Subjective Assessments 
Although portions of the Watson and Wards Cove cases have been made 
impotent as precedents due to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the act did not address 
the issue of subjective assessments. It is reasonable to assume that many more 
cases will arise where subjective assessments are being challenged. Both Rebell 
(1990b) and Phillips (1993) have pointed out that the testing issues in Watson 
were less complex than those posed by some of the currently proposed perfor-
mance tasks . 
The question remaining is whether it is reasonable and technically feasible to apply 
the EEOC Guidelines to sllch performance (subjective) tasks. (Phillips, 1993, p. 
735) 
It is too soon to know how demanding the courts will be regarding the 
psychometric properties of subjective assessments. However, it would seem that 
the psychometric community would desire high quality assessments whether they 
be considered objective or subjective. Thus, one should not anticipate support from 
the psychometric community for subjective assessments that have low reliability, 
low validity, inadequate equating procedures, etc. (It is true that the specific 
operational definitions of validity and reliability may be somewhat different for 
subjective assessments.) 
2. LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL BASES 55 
SUMMARY 
The general legal setting within which employment and licensure tests are 
judged has been described in thi s chapter. Generic legal issues include the 
constitutional requirements (primarily of the 14th Amendment) and the statutory 
requirements of the Civil Rights Acts. Basically the Constitution requires equal 
protection and due process. The Civ il Rights Acts prohibit disparate treatment and 
disparate impact. 
A distinction was made between employment and licensure/certification test-
ing. The purposes of these types of testing are quite different and logically should 
lead to different test development procedures. There is some uncertainty about 
whether the Civil Rights Acts and the EEOC Guidelines are applicable to licensure 
tests. This is an important issue because the Civil Rights Acts call for a business 
necessity requirement, which is considered harder to demonstrate than the legiti -
mate relationship requirement that the 14th Amendment calls for. 
The more relevant portions of a variety of professional standards and codes for 
licensure tests were summarized. Although both the AERAIAPA/NCME Stan-
dards and the EEOC Guidelines are somewhat dated, they have been used 
extensively in previous court cases (the Guidelines for employment tests) and, thus, 
there is some legal precedent based on these standards. 
Several of the more important employment and licensure court decisions were 
discussed. In general, it would appear that higher test development/validation 
standards have been set for employment decisions than for licensure decisions. The 
courts have accepted a variety of kinds of validity ev idence and are (generally) 
reluctant to second-guess cut scores that have been established by obtaining the 
judgments of individuals in the profess ion/occupation in question. 
Future directions with respect to legal precedents will be somewhat dependent 
upon the upcoming revision of the Standards. It is unclear what recent legislation 
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Americans with Disabilities Act will 
have on court dec isions. Basicall y, the new Civil Rights Act reaffirms the business 
necessity requirement that was the basis for many previous decisions. The 
Americans with Disabilities Act may result in increased accommodations for those 
with claimed di sabilities. The movement to more subjective based assessments 
coupled with the Watson and Wards Cove rulings that subjective assessments are 
subject to test development standards should result in some interesting court cases. 
Although an agency can always be sued, and one can never predict how a judge 
will rule, there has been enough precedent to suggest that if one develops an exam 
with professional care, there should be a good chance that the test will be declared 
legally acceptable. 
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